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The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and
Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa
This report was supported by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) through a contract with Management Services International (MSI). The views
and observations expressed do not necessarily reflect those of USAID. This report is a
product completed for USAID/REDSO under the DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis
Task Order, managed by Ned Greeley and Eric Richardson with Lee Foley.
Executive Summary
In 1991, four months after the collapse of the government of the Somali Democratic
Republic, and the flight of its President, Mohamed Siyad Barre, the Republic of
Somaliland was declared an independent state. The past decade has witnessed the struggle
of the young state to resolve violent internal conflicts, to build sustainable peace among
the different groups that constitute its population, to build a state that will sustain peace,
and to rebuild an economy that will sustain the population. At the turn of the century, it
has remarkably make significant progress towards accomplishing the first two aims, and
is now embarking on the second two, perhaps more challenging, aims.
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The WarTorn Societies Program (WSP) is a participatory action research (PAR) program
that facilitates policyoriented dialogue between representatives of the different sectors of
the society  national government, local government, civil society organizations,
traditional leaders, and other actors appropriate to the topic of specific dialogues  with
the goal of contributing to postconflict peace building. Although WSP aims to engage all
levels of society in the dialogue process, the majority of participants in the program are
middle and higher (although not highest) level actors.
The field research for the evaluation was conducted during the twoweek period from
September 10 to September 24. One week was spent in Nairobi, Kenya and one week was
spent in Somaliland. The research included interviews in Nairobi and Hargeisa,
interviews and a focus group in Sheikh, and observation of two days of a three day WSP
workshop in Gabiley and focus groups with some of the participants in the workshop.
The WarTorn Societies Program, produces tangible products in the form of
documentation of the substantive issues that emerge from the participatory action research
process. While the quality and utilization of these products can be assessed, the
fundamental goal of the program is focused less on the products than on the process itself,
which is intangible. As such, assessing the program presents unique challenges, since its
impacts on peace building can rarely be separated from the impacts of other interventions
and other events. In addition, the program is still in its early phases in Somaliland, so it is
too soon to gauge the overall impact that it is likely to make.
Nevertheless, the stage of peace building in which Somaliland is situated, combined with
Somaliland’s particular history and culture, suggests that WSP is an ideal intervention for
Somaliland at the present time. The findings of this evaluation confirm this to be the case.
For although the intervention has not made  and does not aim to make  immediate
tangible contributions to peace (such as the signing of peace accords), the multiplex
causes of the conflicts in Somaliland and the complex nature of the choices that have to
be made in relation to statebuilding and reconstruction, can only be resolved by
processes that allow these complexities to be articulated and the implications of different
courses of action to be explored.
There are a number of ways in which the program might enhance its impacts. One is to
find a way to strengthen its relationships with international organizations, both in
Hargeisa and in Nairobi, in a way that does not diminish ownership of the program by
Somalilanders. The second is to renew its commitment to the full integration of women
into the political and economic life of Somaliland as a key goal. Finally, As WSP expands
its work to regions beyond Somaliland and Puntland, it is recommended that the program
begin in regions on the periphery, rather than in Mogadishu.
Introduction
http://www.mbali.info/doc126.htm
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Among the goals of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative Peace Building Project is the
development of policy guidelines for best practices. One component of the Project
involves the evaluation of the impacts of three different intervention types  middlelevel
dialogues, peace radio, and grassrootslevel intercommunal dialogue  as they have been
implemented in six different contexts in the subregion. This paper presents the findings
of an evaluation of the impact of the WarTorn Societies Program (WSP) as it has been
implemented in Somaliland.
WSP is a participatory action research (PAR) program that facilitates policyoriented
dialogue between representatives of the different sectors of the society  national
government, local government, civil society organizations, traditional leaders, and other
actors appropriate to the topic of specific dialogues. Although WSP aims to engage all
levels of society in the dialogue process, the majority of participants in the program are
middle and higher (although not highest) level actors. The field research for the
evaluation was conducted during the twoweek period from September 10 to September
24. One week was spent in Nairobi, Kenya and one week was spent in Somaliland. The
research included interviews in Nairobi and Hargeisa, interviews and a focus group in
Sheikh, and observation of two days of a three day WSP workshop in Gabiley and focus
groups with some of the participants in the workshop.
This paper will begin with an overview of the events leading to Somaliland’s declaration
of independence in 1991, the internal conflicts that occurred in the middle of the decade,
the processes that brought about the current peace, and the ongoing processes of peace
building and statebuilding. Traditional political and jural culture, how these have evolved
over time, and existing capacities for peace will also be examined.
The sources of past conflicts in Somaliland and potential sources of threats to sustainable
peace will be discussed, focusing on six dimensions that the conflict resolution and peace
building literature identify as both common causes of protracted conflicts and as areas on
which interventions aim to have an impact. These are: economic sources, intergroup
relationships, mobilization, public institutions and processes, political leaders and specific
issues, and public behavior and events.
The WarTorn Societies Program, both worldwide and as it has been implemented in
Somaliland will be described and the findings of the “process” component of the
evaluation will be discussed. The findings of the “outcomes” component of the evaluation
will be discussed as they impact on the six dimensions listed above. In addition, internal
and external circumstances that may have affected the program’s impact will be
examined. Finally, some recommendations for enhancing the program’s contribution to
building sustainable peace in Somaliland, as well as in Somalia, will be made.
Events of the Conflict
http://www.mbali.info/doc126.htm
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Conflict in the Somali Democratic Republic
For at least a decade, the government of the Somali Democratic Republic under dictator
Mohamed Siyad Barre had singled out the Isaq clan family of, what was then,
northwestern Somalia for political and economic oppression. In response, an opposition
group, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was organized and established bases in
Ethiopia. The SNM waged a guerrilla war against Barre’s forces in northwestern Somalia
that resulted in further retaliation against the Isaq. Meanwhile the Barre regime strove to
sow the seeds of conflict between the Isaq and other clan families of northwestern
Somalia, including the Gudabirsi clan of the Dir clan family and the Dolbahante and
Warsangeli clans of the Darod clan family.
The conflict with Barre’s regime became all out war in April 1988, with the signature of a
peace accord between Somalia and Ethiopia, agreeing to normalize their relations and to
cease supporting each other's opposition groups (the Somali groups being the SNM and
the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) from the northeastern region of Somalia).
In desperation, the SNM attacked government military installations in Hargeisa and
Burco. Barre's forces responded with a massive air and ground assault, bombarding
northern cities and laying land mines. An estimated 50,000 people were killed and at least
half a million fled to refugee camps in Ethiopia and Djibouti. One Somalilander who was
in Hargeisa at the time of the bombing commented, "at different times in my lifetime I
have expected to be bombed by the British, by the Italians, by the Americans, by the
Russians, by the Kenyans, and by the Ethiopians, but I have never expected to be bombed
by Somalis."
In the meantime, new opposition groups were organizing in the southern regions of
Somalia. Two years later, one of these, the United Somali Congress (USC) marched on
Mogadishu, resulting in the flight of Siyad Barre and the total collapse of the government.
Somalia remained without a central authority until the National Peace Conference in
Djibouti (2001) that formed a government. It is too soon to say whether or not it can
establish its authority and its legitimacy throughout the country and build a lasting peace.
The Republic of Somaliland, (encompassing the territory that constituted the former
British Somaliland Protectorate) declared its independence from the rest of Somalia in
May 1991 and quickly set about the business of internal peace building and
nationbuilding. However, a decade of oppression and conflict had left the country and the
people devastated by war and its infrastructure and its institutions largely destroyed.
Conflict, Peace Building and State Building in Somaliland
In February 1991, a conference of the Guurti  the council of traditional clan leaders or
Elders of Somaliland  took place in Berbera. The meeting established a ceasefire and
fixed the date for another conference to be held in Burco in April and May. The
http://www.mbali.info/doc126.htm
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accomplishments of the Burco conference included the declaration of the independence of
the Somaliland Republic, the establishment of a transitional twoyear rule by the SNM
(which included a role for nonIsaq clans during this period), and the initiation of a peace
process with the eastern region of Sanaag. Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali “Tuur”, a former
diplomat, the incumbent Chairman of the civilian wing of the SNM, and a Haber Yoonis
(a subclan of the Garxajis clan of the Isaq clan family), was made interim President of
the transitional administration. From February until September 1991, Somaliland enjoyed
a period of peace.
The Burco conference, while it contributed to peace between the Isaq and neighboring
clans, did not address tensions within the Isaq clans and within the SNM. With few
financial resources, the interim administration was unable to control the still armed and
mobilized SNM, as well as nonIsaq, militias. This inability to impose law and order
resulted in rampant insecurity and political uncertainty.
“Tuur’s” administration soon found itself at war with a coalition of clanbased militias,
which were linked to the Calan Cas, the military wing of the SNM. The Calan Cas
accused the government of being dominated by civilians and “Tuur”’s Haber Yoonis clan
at the expense of the military and other clans. The association of the first SNM interim
administration with the Haber Yoonis led the rival Haber Jeclo to become the first major
Isaq clan to oppose the interim administration. The longstanding rivalry between the
Haber Yoonis and Haber Jeclo, which had been subordinated during the civil war in the
face of a common enemy, now reasserted itself with a vengeance.
Competition for political and economic dominance (of the livestock trade in particular)
resulted in the outbreak of violent conflict between the Haber Yoonis and Haber Jaclo
clans in the town that they share, Burco, in January 1991. The confrontation was
shortlived, and was resolved by the Gudabirsi and other nonIsaq clan Elders (a role they
played in subsequent intraIsaq conflicts as well), but it highlighted the inability of the
Guurti to resolve the internal tensions of the SNM, and contributed to a more serious
subsequent conflict.
The second outbreak of violence occurred in Berbera between the Haber Yoonis and the
Cisa Musa. In March 1992, the administration attempted to form a national army and to
establish government control of revenuegenerating public facilities, including the
lucrative port of Berbera. The government had few sources of revenue, while the port was
providing the militias with the resources to purchase weapons. This was therefore
perceived as a significant source of continuing insecurity.
The town of Berbera is inhabited by several Isaq clans, including the Saad Musa (who
have substantial business interests in the town), the Cisa Musa (the original inhabitants of
the town), the Haber Yoonis, and other smaller clans. The Cisa Musa, whose militias
controlled the port, perceived this move as an attempt by the Haber Yoonis to usurp their
http://www.mbali.info/doc126.htm
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control of this revenuegenerating resource. In an effort to avoid an escalation of the
conflict, all but the Haber Yoonis withdrew from the army and the attempt to gain control
of the port. Six months of violent conflict ensued between the two clans. The efforts of
both the Isaq political elite and the Isaq Guurti failed to resolve the conflict during this
period.
Finally, in October 1992, the Guurti intervened, with the Gudabirsi once again playing the
role of peacemaker. A conference was held in Sheikh at which a ceasefire was agreed to
and an agenda was set for a subsequent conference of the Guurti in Borama to restore
peace (nabadeyn) and to deliberate the future of Somaliland (aaya ka talin). This
conference, referred to as the Grand Borama Conference, took place between January and
May of 1993. The 150member Guurti and hundreds of delegates and observers from
across Somaliland participated in the conference.
Several important agreements were reached at the Grand Borama Conference. The first
was the transition from the SNM interim government to a system based on clan
representation. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Cigal, a civilian and a Cisa Musa from Berbera,
was selected to be president and Abdirahman Aw Ali, a Gudabirsi, was selected to be
vicepresident. The choice of Cigal was designed both to appease the Cisa Musa and to
divide them, which served to undermine their power in Berbera. Third, a National Charter
and a Peace Charter, were adopted. These were to serve as the framework for the next two
years during the processes of state building and peace building, respectively.
The National Charter served as an interim constitution from 1993 to 1997, while the
Peace Charter outlined procedures for the peace building mandate of the Guurti, who
were to review and revise the ongoing peace processes throughout the country. The
administrative structure agreed to at the conference is made up of three branches: a two
chamber legislature, an executive council, and an independent judiciary. One chamber of
the legislature is comprised of an elected parliament, while the other is comprised of the
Council of Elders, the Guurti.
The government of Cigal was more successful than that of “Tuur” in establishing its
authority over revenuegenerating public facilities, such as the port of and the customs
office in Gabiley, through which qaat imported from Ethiopia must pass, which created a
source of income for the administration to carry out its basic functions and to send peace
building delegations all over Somaliland. The introduction of the Somaliland shilling and
the opening of the central bank bolstered the financial base of the administration. A
judicial system made up of regional and district courts and a police force were established
and began operations, at least in the central and western towns over which the had
government control.
Yet peace was again disrupted in November 1994, by violent conflict between
government forces (a coalition of nonGarxajis clans) and Garxajis militias over the
http://www.mbali.info/doc126.htm
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control of Hargeisa airport in November 1994. The conflict expanded to engulf Burco in
March 1995 and continued until 1996, resulting in considerable destruction in both cities.
In the midst of the conflict in 1995, Cigal’s first tenure in office expired. The Guurti
extended his term in office by 18 months to avoid the total disintegration of Somaliland.
However the opposition viewed this decision as unconstitutional and a violation of the
National Charter.
The conflict had deescalated by the time the next Guurti conference was held in Hargeisa
between October 1996 and February 1997. At this conference, Cigal was chosen for
another fiveyear term as president, and a new vicepresident, Dahir Riyalle Kahin, was
chosen. An agreement was also reached on a new threeyear provisional constitutional
document, which has served as the first draft of the constitution, the share of opposition
groups in the two chambers of the legislature was increased, and minority communities
were given a share.
Somaliland has continued to enjoy peace since the Hargeisa conference. As one member
of Parliament said, “By the time the WSP started, there was peace throughout Somaliland
and it is getting better everyday.”. Everyone who was interviewed as part of this
evaluation acknowledged that it is, however, a fragile peace. Monumental tasks remain,
including the preparation of the Provisional Constitution, a proposed referendum on the
Provisional Constitution and the sovereignty of Somaliland, the establishment of political
parties, a national election, reconstruction of infrastructure, the establishment of financial
institutions, development of the social services sector, and many others. It is to these tasks
that WSP addresses itself.
(The information for this section was based on interviews conducted as part of this
evaluation, the SelfPortrait of Somaliland and the unpublished manuscript for a
forthcoming book by Ahmed Yusuf Farah.)
Indigenous Conflict Resolution and Existing Capacities for Peace
Traditionally, the basic political and jural unit of the pastoralist society of Somaliland was
the diyapaying group, which is constituted by a lineage or coalition of lineages
(comprised of a depth of between 4 and 8 generations within the subclan). Lewis (1994)
defines the diyapaying group as "a corporate agnatic group whose members are united in
joint responsibility towards outsiders". The diyapaying group is collectively responsible
for the payment of compensation in the event of the death or injury of a member of
another group at the hands of one of its members. It is also collectively entitled to the
receipt of compensation in the event of the death or injury of one of its members at the
hands of a member of another group. Although based on lineage, the diyapaying group is
nevertheless somewhat fluid, especially when it involves coalitions of lineages.
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The primacy of the diyapaying group was mitigated somewhat by the practice of xeer
which was sometimes complementary with and sometimes contrary to genealogical
relationships. Xeer is an enforceable, formal contract, that can be of a political, an
economic, or a social nature, and of either a longterm or a shortterm duration. Yet
Somalilanders often use the term to describe different situations that form a continuum
from a formal agreement to a custom. Both the breeching of a formal agreement and the
violation of a custom are subject to sanctions.
Traditionally there were no formal positions of authority in Somaliland. Elders
represented the lineage segments at the levels of clans, subclans and diyapaying groups;
and policies were made in meetings in which all adult male members of the group had the
right to participate. The scope of the participants (in terms of the structural level of
lineage segments) was determined by the situation  a classic feature of segmentary
lineage systems.
The British colonial administration, however, formalized both diya paying group and
xeer. According to Lewis (1994), "Diyapaying groups act similarly in less serious issues
and the interests of their members are defined by written treaties (sg, heer) which are
lodged in District Offices" and "Diyapaying contracts thus define the basic jural and
political status of the individual and are so regarded by the administration in the
settlement of disputes".
However, both the British colonial administration and Siyad Barre's government were
dependent on the heads of diyapaying groups as intermediaries between their
administrations and the people of Somaliland. Both the British and Barre attempted and
often succeeded in using Elders to extend their authority over their constituencies, and
although formal authority was not vested in Elders, under either the British or Barre, they
often received generous compensation.
In Somaliland there is a relationship between territory and lineage (at the clan family and
clan levels, but not at the subclan level) based, not on ownership, but on occupation of
the land. "Thus, ultimately, men and their stock move where they will be subject only to
their ability to maintain their position against others, if necessary by force. It is usually
only in time of war, or when there is exceptional pressure on available grazing, that
prescriptive rights of use are claimed and, if they are challenged, these can be maintained
effectively only by force." (Lewis, 1994).
Colonialism changed these relationships however. Simons (1995) writes, "....the
requirements of pastoral nomadism  with grazing areas and water points often left
unprotected  can lead to festering disputes over who actually controls these invaluable
resources. Without being able to permanently stay put, groups of Somalis have had to
work out their differences over these areas through negotiation or conflict on a seasonal
basis....." But, she continues, "...colonial officials sought to curtail pastoral sources of
http://www.mbali.info/doc126.htm
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conflict through more clearly defining which grazing grounds and water sources belonged
to which groups. At the same time, the very process of mapping clear lines of usership led
to intense jockeying among rival groups of Somalis before control could be established
and then once it was, over whether the new rules were just."
Postcolonial government policies, international development assistance policies, and the
urbanization that resulted from them, further contributed to modifying the traditional
political and judicial systems of urban Somaliland populations  not to mention their
subsistence bases. Urbanization contributed to changing the bases of individual identity as
well. In the postcolonial urban setting lineage continued to be the fundamental building
block of individual identity, but that source of identity overlapped with other sources of
identity, including education and profession. In spite of the fact that who became a
member of educated and professional classes or the political and business elites was
largely determined by lineage, identity based on membership in these other groups had a
life of its own that was separate from lineage identity. All that ended with the outbreak of
the war, when clan identity became a matter of life and death. Individuals who may have
once aspired to be “clanblind” suddenly had no choice but to revive the primacy of clan.
The practice of xeer was also modified by and adapted to urbanization. Suddenly clans
who had no previous contact, and who had quite different traditions of xeer, were living
side by side  and having conflicts with each other. When a conflict arose between urban
residents who were members of different clans, the Elders of each clan got together and
discussed how the xeer addressed conflicts of a similar nature in their respective regions
of origin or within their respective clan families. They then forged a new xeer (since it
was understood that other conflicts of a similar nature were sure to arise in the future) that
was agreeable to both and that made sense in the urban context. (This material is based on
interviews that were conducted as part of this author’s dissertation research.)
Thus many practices were modified during the transition from rural to urban settings in
ways that enabled them to continue to be effective for resolving conflicts and other crises.
This was the case for practices such as diya, for example payments that used to be made
in camels, were now made in the cash equivalent of camels. But other practices involving
collective responsibility for individual misdeeds pose problems that are not so easily
resolved in the context of an urbanized nationstate.
The experience of WSP researcher highlights the fact that this is a challenge that remains
to be faced by the nationstate. The researcher responsible for the Livestock Marketing
Workshop in Burco was arrested by local police and put in jail when he arrived in town to
conduct the workshop. It emerged that a member of the researcher’s clan had been killed
a member of a clan from Burco. The researcher was to be held until his clan fulfilled its
diya obligations to the clan of the victim. Other members of the WSP researcher team
conducted the workshop and negotiations with local authorities eventually secured the
http://www.mbali.info/doc126.htm
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researcher’s release. Such occurrences are not unusual in a context in which parallel  and
fundamentally different  justice systems exist simultaneously.
As described in the previous section, the Guurti not only fulfilled its traditional functions
in the context of the vacuum created by the collapse of the Somalia Democratic Republic
and the troubled fledging Somaliland administrations, it ingeniously adapted them to a
much changed and more challenging context. Their successes at peace building, and
Cigal’s dependence on them during the early years of his administration, earned them an
important and institutionalized place in the new government.
However institutionalization of the Guurti involved a trade off. Farah (2000) writes, “But
the new status of the Guurti as salaried civil servants cost them their perceived neutrality
and moral authority, central elements in the traditional method of reconciliation in Somali
society. With a vested interest in the survival of the government, the Guurti utterly failed
to settle peacefully the second cycle of fighting between their paymasters (the
government) and the Garxajis opposition. The politicization of the Guurti undermined an
important local peacemaking instrument and allowed the fighting to drag on much longer
than did the first cycle of fighting.”
The failure of the Guurti to dispense their constitutionally mandated role as peacemakers
and conflict resolvers, resulted in the intervention in 1995 of the Somaliland Peace
Committee, comprised of a group of intellectuals and professionals from the diaspora.
Both parties to the conflict  the government and the opposition  were suspicious of the
motivations of the Peace Committee, and as a result their contributions as a third party
were consequently less than they might have been. Nevertheless their efforts helped “to
put peace back on the agenda” (Farah, 2000).
More importantly the intervention of the Somaliland Peace Committee suggests that the
diaspora is another untapped resource for peace building. Indeed, Somalilanders possess
greater resources than are generally perceived or acknowledged, by either themselves or
by the international community. Logan (2000) writes, “They have a rich, highly
democratic political tradition, and their more recent political experiences have produced
deeply ingrained lessons about what does not work, as well as a strongly felt and widely
shared desire for peace.... In combination with the keen interest of and resources provided
by the diaspora, as well as the often underestimated local resource base, these
characteristics have proven powerful tools for locallydriven political and economic
reconstruction.”
The Stage of the Conflict
Adam Curle (1971) identifies four stages in the progression of a conflict based on a three
sided matrix. At the top of the matrix is a continuum from unpeaceful to peaceful. There
are three stages along this continuum: static, unstable, and dynamic. At the bottom of the
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matrix is a continuum from low to high awareness of the conflict. There are two stages
along this continuum: latent conflict and overt conflict. On the right hand side of the
matrix is power, the bottom half representing unbalanced power and the top half
representing balanced power.
Of the six quadrants formed, two are empty, while four suggest interventions appropriate
to the conditions in the quadrant. Quadrant one, with low awareness of the conflict,
unbalanced power, and static relations, suggests education. Quadrant two, with high
awareness of the conflict, unbalanced power, and unstable relations, suggests
confrontation. Quadrant three, with high awareness of the conflict, balanced power, and
unstable relations, suggests negotiation. Finally, quadrant four, with balanced power and
dynamic relations, suggests sustainable peace.
In quadrant four, successful negotiations and/or mediation have resulted in a restructuring
of the relationship around both substantive and procedural issues. Curle refers to these as
“increased justice” and “more peaceful relations”, reminding us that in any stage of the
conflict, it can jump forward, jump backward, or cycle through all four of the quadrants
for extended periods of time. At this writing, Somaliland is situated on the cusp of the
third and fourth quadrants (although since independence, at different times and in
different places, it has cycled through each of the quadrants). This is the phase or location
that WSP specifically and explicitly targets.
Sources of the Conflict: Six Dimensions of Interest
Economic Sources
Prior to the civil war the Somali Democratic Republic was one of the poorest and least
developed countries in the world, whether the instrument used to measure it was based on
macroeconomic indicators or human development indicators. Two decades of economic
crises, political crises and conflict have devastated the economy of both Somalia and
Somaliland.
In Somaliland, Siyad Barre’s assault, the subsequent internal wars, and the random
destructiveness of the dayday (gangs of armed young men, some of whom are remnants
of the militias, who have become common thugs and bandits) have resulted in the
destruction of both public and private infrastructure, including utilities, runways, roads,
bridges, port facilities, factories, wells, irrigation systems, and abbatoirs.
Both public and private institutions relating to the economy have also ceased to function.
With the exception of the Central Bank of Somaliland, financial institutions, including
commercial banks, credit institutions, and insurance services, no longer exist. The
government has not succeeded in creating a predictable regulatory climate, which has
discouraged foreign investment. Markets have been monopolized by large traders at the
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expense of small traders and consumers. Finally, taxation is uncoordinated between the
different levels of government, creating unpredictability and a heavy burden for business
people.
But for Somalilanders, the economic sources of the conflict are related as much, if not
more, to the inequitable distribution of resources than to the absolute value of resources.
Conditions in which some clans have had greater access to resources than other clans tend
to generate more conflict than scarcity in and of itself. Such competitiveness is an
outgrowth of the experience with the colonial administration, whose policies favored
some clans over others, and more importantly, of the policies of postcolonial
governments which hoarded resources for themselves and their own clans, and denied
access to resources to others. Indeed, Siyad Barre’s denial of access of resources to the
Isaq clan family was one of the worse cases of this phenomenon in Somali history.
Foreign assistance has also often contributed to conflict generation in Somalia and
Somaliland. There are two primary reasons for this. The first is that some development
assistance has been downright inappropriate. This began with the colonial
administration’s digging of wells in the Haud that resulted in environmental degradation
and sedentarization, (both of which inadvertently created winners and losers) and
continued until the collapse of the government of the Somali Democratic Republic. The
second is that postcolonial governments deliberately employed foreign assistance to
create winners and losers. Somalilanders were victims of such policies during the
humanitarian crisis created by the irredentist war between Somalia and Ethiopia. Siyad
Barre used humanitarian assistance to create advantages for refugee populations (from his
mother’s Ogaden clan) at the expense of Somalilanders on their own soil.
Indeed, the paucity of development assistance was attributed, by some Somalilanders
interviewed for this paper, as one of the reasons that Somaliland has been so successful in
achieving peace. It has enabled Somalilanders to seek solutions to their own economic
and political problems in their own ways and at their own pace. It has also lessened
conflict between different individuals and groups who would have vied for access to and
control of foreign assistance resources.
As in most African countries, a contributing cause of violent conflicts over control of the
government is related to the use of that control (of revenues and/or of foreign assistance)
as a source of personal enrichment. This is in part because there was a paucity of income
generation alternatives. That is less the case in Somaliland than in Somalia, where at least
in the western part of the country, favorable conditions for livestock production and its
location on the sea and in proximity to the Arabian peninsula, have contributed to a robust
commercial sector during much of its history. The commercial sector continues to provide
some Somalilanders opportunities outside of government for incomegeneration, if not
enrichment.
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Clan politics have resulted in the lack of the establishment of a permanent class of
professionals based on meritocracy. Individuals with professional training often
consequently leave for better opportunities elsewhere (although they return when their
clan is in power) leading to further underdevelopment. Thus for example, while
UNCTAD is rehabilitating infrastructure at Berbera port, it finds that institutional
arrangements are an ongoing problem. While there are many Somalilanders with the
technical training necessary to operate the port (UNCTAD offers technical training as
well) retention of personnel depends on what clan is controlling the port at a given time.
The presence or absence of economic resources and who controls them also has an impact
on security. Revenues can be used for peaceful means or to perpetrate violence. During
the complex emergency in Somalia in the early 1990s, food and other supplies provided
by humanitarian assistance organizations were stolen by militias and bandits and sold to
purchase weapons. As has already been described in this paper, militias controlling the
port in Berbera and later the airport in Hargeisa, used revenues from these sources to
purchase weapons, thereby increasing both the actual level of violence and the potential
for violence.
The need for demobilization and reintegration of excombatants is recognized, but lack of
resources and expertise has meant that the government and local business people have
been unable to sustain their efforts. Anticipated aid for demobilization and reintegration
from international organizations has not been forthcoming, although some NGOs have
contributed modest support.
Somaliland suffers from exceedingly high unemployment, which is often cited as a source
of insecurity, since lack of employment is since is considered one of the reasons for
joining the militias and for banditry. High unemployment is in turn blamed for the
pervasive use of qaat. Participants in the workshop on the impact of qaat on family and
society included qaat retailers, who are generally women. When one of the retailers was
accused of being part of the qaat problem, she responded, “Give me another job and I will
do something else.”
There is general consensus that qaat contributes to all kinds of economic (consuming
large percentages of both public and private time and money that could be used more
productively) and social ills (having deleterious effects on physical and mental health and
on marital and parental relationships); but without alternative sources of income qaat will
continue to be an important source of income for individuals and an important source of
revenue for the government, which a member of the national government reported
accounts for as much as 20 percent of national and local governments’ incomes.
However, it is the export of livestock that accounts for the bulk of Somaliland’s and the
government’s income. In 1997, Somalilanders earned 176.6 million USD from livestock,
from which the government revenues were 7 million USD (Ministry of Planning, 1998
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1999). However, Somaliland’s reliance on the livestock trade, and especially its almost
complete reliance on one market, has been demonstrated to be a liability. Between
October 1998 and March 1999, Saudi Arabia, Somaliland’s main customer, imposed a
complete ban on livestock imports from all countries in northeastern Africa, due to Rift
Valley Fever. (There has been a ban on cattle from the region since 1983 due to
rinderpest.) As soon as the ban was lifted, the economy boomed, only to have the ban
imposed again in September of this year, because there were a number of deaths in Saudi
Arabia caused by this zootic disease. The ban is still in place at this writing.
The result of the first ban highlighted another liability facing Somaliland’s economy  the
price paid by the administration to maintain peace. Farah (2000) explains, “The outbreak
of war in 1994 derailed local efforts toward demobilization, politicized the issue of
security and led to the reversal of a 1993 government pledge not to form an army. To the
chagrin of the opposition, and at the cost of being accused of violating the Interim
Charter, the government launched a relatively largescale recruitment of clan militias into
the National Army.” But aside from what the government perceived to be its legitimate
need for an army, the government used enlistment into the army and the civil service as an
inducement and a reward for loyalty.
The 1998 livestock ban created a budget deficit and the administration was unable to pay
the salaries of the inflated army and civil service. The administration thus appealed to
international donors for financial assistance to cover the estimated revenue shortfall, and a
portion of the shortfall was met by international organizations. Farah (2000) writes, “The
government appeal and donor response documents reveal important information about the
burden the large security forces and the inflated public service have placed on the limited
budget of the administration: almost 95% of revenue is spent on administration (2023%)
and defense and security (72%). There is little going to the productive infrastructure (3%)
and social (35%) sectors.” International organizations continue to take up the slack in
infrastructure rehabilitation and the provision of social services, such as health care and
education.
One member of the national government acknowledged that there are thousands of
superfluous security forces on the government payroll in need of demobilization and
reintegration. This is not only not sustainable, it impedes the development of the
productive sectors, from which citizens can obtain sustainable and legitimate sources of
nongovernmental income. “Somaliland’s checkered experience in peacekeeping and
governance during the prolonged transition period bespeaks the disruptive influence SNM
clan militias and the power struggle within the SNM political elite have had on political
development, internal security, and overall socioeconomic reconstruction. The creation of
a large army may overcome internal strife but it cannot guarantee domestic stability and
an environment conducive to political rebuilding and a transition to a democratic system
of governance.” (Farah 2000).
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InterGroup Relationships
It is commonly acknowledged that clan relations are one of the root causes of conflict in
Somaliland. Indeed clan is the building block of individual and group identity. But this is
not in and of itself problematic and can have positive as well as negative ramifications. In
general it can be said that the root of the problem is to be found in the imposition of a
Westernstyle nationstate on a people whose culture and history are entirely different
from those of the West. This is especially the case when the nationstate that results is
characterized by authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism, and other ills. However those ills
are themselves partially a result of the poor fit between traditional and Westernstyle
governance.
In Somaliland, the dominant Isaq family clan has been much more successful than was
anticipated in resolving conflicts with other clan families  most notably with the Dir. It
has had less success in addressing conflict within the Isaq. In addition, potential conflict
between the Isaq and the Darod clan families of eastern Somaliland has remained latent
for most of the past decade, rather than having been resolved.
There are other group and individual identities or categories around which people
mobilize and which sometimes result in intergroup conflict. An important distinction in
Somaliland since it declared independence pertains to the civilian versus the military
wings of the SNM and their constituents. Militarized political culture may represent the
most serious threat to sustainable peace both in terms of the everpresent threat of military
takeover and the political culture of compliance in the face of authority. “Siyad Barre’s
militarized socialist state ruthlessly suppressed the evolution of democratic institutions
and culture for a period of two decades. The final disintegration of the national forces and
the governing military elite in January 1991 left an enduring political void and leadership
crisis. The clanbased guerrilla organizations replacing the system of socialist military
government were unable to establish centralized authority and resurrect the Somali State,
thereby precipitating the country’s dismemberment into unstable ministates controlled by
‘big men’ (Farah, 2000). He continues, “The military elite governed the Democratic
Republic of Somalia more than a decade longer than the preceding civilian leaders, and
therefore produced more military officials than civilians to aspire to public office in
Somalia's’ postmilitary period. This left a legacy of entrenched militarization of political
leadership that will take some time to reverse.... domestic peace and the return to a
democratic system of governance are still very much influenced by the military elite.”
The Calan Cas leaders fought for the independence of Somaliland and believe that they
have earned their right to political power. They perceive that they are being deliberately
ignored by Cigal’s administration and want to have a hand in governing the country.
Tension also exists between the Parliament and the Guurti, although it is not clear the
extent to which this is a conflict between traditional and Westernized leaders and
governance styles; or whether it is related to one of the main issues facing the drafters of
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the Constitution, which is the degree of power to reside in the Executive and the degree to
reside in the Legislature. The Guurti has, in fact, supported Cigal’s efforts to form a
centralized government based on a strong executive branch, while Parliament has
generally supported the formation of a decentralized government based on a strong
legislature. This has resulted in the Guurti and Parliament being opposed to each other on
this issue. One MP said, “Cigal has used the Elders as a rubber stamp and he has used
them against Parliament”.
There are also tensions between government and civil society. A decade ago, civil society
in any sense, was an almost nonexistence phenomena in Somaliland and Somalia. Civil
society has come into being during the past decade, for several reasons, including the
insistence of international organizations that they have local partners to implement
projects and through whom to channel funds, the vacuum left by the collapse of the
Somali Democratic Republic’s government, as a means for members of the diaspora to
provide assistance to Somaliland, and as a means of incomegeneration to gain access to
donor funds targeted for specific populations (eg women) or activities (eg conflict
resolution skills training).
Tension between government and civil society is inherent in a political culture with a
legacy of authoritarianism and militarization. But tension has also been caused by
international assistance to Somaliland that has not succeeded in balancing its support to
strengthen civil society with its support to strengthen the government. The reasons for this
are numerous, including the fact that not officially recognizing Somaliland has prohibited
direct assistance to the government for some organizations, and the current climate in the
international community which views governments as part of the problem rather than part
of the solution.
Somaliland society exhibits other cleavages  between urban and rural, between the young
and the old, between those with formal education and those without, between the upper
and middle classes and the masses, between those who have lived abroad and those who
have not. These are for the most part overlapping cleavages that are crosscut by clan. The
cumulative effect of overlapping cleavages is that Somalilanders are divided by what
Oscar Nudler refers to as a “worldview conflict”. In Somaliland, worldview conflict
exists not only between groups, but also within individuals, especially those who have
returned from the diaspora. As more members of the diaspora return to Somaliland, the
potential exists that there may be an increase in conflicts whose causes are differences of
worldview. The highly contested issue of the role of women in Somaliland is a salient
example of a worldview conflict.
At the time of this writing, religion in the sense of different approaches to Islam  was not
a cause of conflict in Somaliland. In neighboring Puntland, relationships between the
SSDF and AlItahad had been a source of conflict.
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Mobilization
The salient feature of mobilization in Somaliland has been the near impossibility of
mobilizing groups on any basis other than clan. It has characteristically been all to easy
for political elites to mobilize their clans to take up arms to protect perceived clan
interests, as was seen by the ease with which Egal was able to mobilize members of the
army belonging to his clan, but not members of the army belonging to other clans, during
the conflict over the Berbera port.
“Somaliland’s prior experience of civil strife suggests that the most serious threat to peace
derives from the deliberate mobilization of grievance based on perceived inequities
between clans. Given the evident regional disparities that exist within Somaliland, the
grounds for collective grievances are real, and constant vigilance is required if conflict is
to be avoided.” (SelfPortrait of Somaliland, 2000, p. 32) But there is an unfortunate lack
of mobilization in Somaliland of other groups  considered by international interveners, at
least  to be essential for democracy. Civil society is an imported category in Somaliland.
It has come about only in the past decade, mainly in response to the need of international
organizations to channel funds through and implement projects using local NGOs. This
has resulted in a plethora of local NGOs whose main interest is incomegeneration for
themselves and their constituents. Generally, local NGOs have been clanbased, have
incompletely understood the concept of civil society, and have not been able to organize
themselves to advocate for their own interests or for the interests of their constituents.
NGOs and other civil society groups must also contend with a political culture that lacks
an understanding of the role of civil society and that is deeply suspicious of civil society.
Women have also been unable to mobilize as an interest group. Women’s groups suffer
from the same weaknesses that characterize other civil society groups. Yet many women
in Somaliland are fed up with being marginalized in the economic and political arenas.
During the war and in the present postwar period, women have provided economic and
social safetynets. As a member of a women’s NGO said, “We have taken care of our
families and communities and have been the sole source of income for our families and
communities. We are still doing those things while our men are unemployed and spending
time and money chewing qaat.” Many women expressed the desire for change, but
acknowledge that they lack the skills and the resources to pursue change effectively.
Logan (2000) writes, “In Somaliland and Puntland, women remain largely marginalized
from participation in the political system, even as their role in the economy has increased
dramatically during and after the conflict.... women must still struggle to overcome
cultural barriers that discourage their participation in politics. Women have also been held
back by their own failure to unify, coordinate and jointly plan their efforts. Given their
increasing economic role and their ability to serve a positive bridging and mediating role
within Somali society, greater women’s participation in politics should be a key goal.”
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Public Institutions and Processes
Somaliland is at a critical juncture in the process of state building at the time of this
writing. It is currently engaged in the exercise of making changes to the provisional
constitution with the goal of drafting a new Constitution that includes a transition from
the clanbased system to an electoral system. The government has set an ambitious
program for itself, that involves the following steps: (1) Parliament will debate changes to
the provisional constitution article by article, until it is accepted by the two legislative
houses. (2) The provisional constitution will be explained to the public over the radio,
article by article. At the same time thousands of copies will be distributed for discussion.
(3) A referendum will take place to approve or reject the provisional constitution. A vote
in favor of the provisional constitution will also mean an endorsement of the sovereignty
of Somaliland. (4) Political parties may then be established, in line with the new
Constitution. (5) The final step will be a national election, in which the people will choose
which party to lead them and elect a new government. (SelfPortrait of Somaliland, 2000,
p.2223) At this writing the first draft of the provisional constitution has been distributed
and the second draft is being discussed in the two legislative houses.
The single most contested issue during this process is related to the issue of
decentralization. Most Somalilanders are convinced that the most effective way to offset
the political culture that has resulted from years of authoritarian governance is to adopt a
federalisttype system, allowing the regions considerable autonomy. It is believed that this
may be the only way to address real and perceived inequities between different clans and
different regions. But numerous issues pertaining to the relationship between national and
local governments will have to be resolved before Somaliland can successfully implement
such a system. Several individuals interviewed said that the issue of decentralization is of
concern to the national government, not because it entails a reduction of its power, but
because of the fear of national disintegration, if it is implemented before Somaliland is
ready.
A WSP staff member said, “In Somaliland, the theme of decentralization in particular has
been threatening to the government because it is still trying to sell the idea of nationhood.
The government has argued that decentralization will lead to disintegration. In fact, some
representatives of the regions in Parliament are also against decentralization, because they
are centerfocused.”
Another issue that will have to be resolved by the new Constitution is related to the
balance of power between the executive branch and the legislative branch. Not
surprisingly, Egal favors the executive and the Parliament the legislative. Some
individuals interviewed said that the Guurti supports Egal because they have been
coopted by him. Others said that the Guurti has served the role of mediating between
Cigal and the Parliament. Several expressed the opinion that by centralizing power in the
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executive, Egal has failed to build the institutions necessary for the government’s
sustainability.
Political Leaders and Public Behavior
A Somalilander interviewed for this paper provided the following explanation of how
Cigal has brought about change during the nationbuilding process. It is included in its
entirety: “Cigal recognized from the outset that one could not afford to ignore the military
men. They have their pride and they have to be taken into account. What the old man did
was to start by bringing in the generals and colonels and making them ministers, and
allowing a degree of corruption, so that they could enrich themselves. Because they are
satisfied they will go back to their regions. Little by little he began replacing them with
civilians. Then he reempowered the elders. He let it be known that if someone wanted
something from the government, say a position in a Ministry, that they would have to gain
access to him through their clan leaders. He did not do so by paying these clan leaders.
Previously the elders had no power, although some were empowered through formal posts
such as the Guurti. But the majority do not hold formal posts. At first each clan had a
Ministry, then he started shifting things around so that different clans had access to
different ministries at different times. Now he is slowly starting to change that as well. He
wants a government that is based on elections rather than the beeled system.”
The WarTorn Societies Project Worldwide
WSP was created in June 1994 as a joint project of the United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development (UNRISD) and the Programme for Strategic and International
Security Studies (PSIS) of the Geneva Graduate Institute for International Studies. It was
launched to assist societies emerging from conflict to identify which issues should be
given priority in terms of policy, among the plethora of critical challenges confronting
them. It was also launched for the purpose of improving international organizations’
efforts to assist these societies. WSP has been piloted in several countries: Guatemala,
Mozambique, Eritrea, and Somalia and Somaliland. The methodology used is
participatory action research (PAR) employing local research teams to promote and
facilitate dialogue among the various actors involved in postconflict rebuilding, by
providing a neutral forum.
WSP Somaliland was initiated with the goal of finding solutions to the difficulties faced
by the international community in responding to the challenges of postconflict
rebuilding. Another goal is the facilitation of an internal, national process belonging to
local actors involved in postconflict rebuilding. In this sense it is a PAR program in
which dialogue and research are used together to set priorities and identify policy options.
The process is characterized by consensus building and capacity building in a neutral
space.
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WSP’s research goals include learning about the relationships between research and
policyformulation and the application of actionresearch at micro and macro levels. The
program also aims to produce lessons relating to the positioning of research in relation to
political processes and state building. Finally, the program aims to fashion the lessons
learned into tools that can be used to effect change in the way that external organizations
plan, implement, and coordinate their activities in countries emerging from conflict.
Objectives
WSP program objectives in Somaliland include ensuring that international assistance
contributes to building peace and does not contribute to renewed conflict, promoting PAR
as a vehicle for democratizing development and empowering communities and
disempowered groups such as women, strengthening the capacity of national and local
government and civil society organizations to contribute to statebuilding and
reconstruction, and building the capacity and ensuring the sustainability of a successor
body, namely the Somaliland Center for Peace and Development. The Director of SCPD,
explained that the idea is to create a “neutral space” where intellectuals can come to
develop and discuss their ideas. “It is not neutral in the sense in which that word is
generally understood  we all know that that type of neutrality doesn’t exist, that people
are only neutral in that sense when they are dead  rather, neutral in the sense of being
able to step back from one’s emotions, if only as long as it takes to drink a cup of tea, and
neutral in the sense that all ideas can be entertained and can be expressed openly.”
Implementation
The first activity of the program is training the local researchers about the WSP PAR
process. In Puntland, WSP has spent only days on the training and therefore found that
the researchers did not have a thorough understanding of the process and had to be
retrained. Learning from this experience, WSP Somaliland therefore spent a month on
this activity.
The first phase of the program was the preparation of the Country Note. This is a
substantive paper discussing the key political, economic, and social issues facing the
country. It was prepared using both existing documentation and by conducting focus
groups in communities throughout Somaliland. The focus groups were conducted in
cities, towns, and villages. One government official said, “They went to every corner of
the country. The only place they did not go was to the wells. The pastoralists were the one
group that was not included. A brainstorming methodology was developed (it was
initially tested in Gabiley and the villages surrounding it) that involved informal give and
take discussions around areas of interest to the participants. A SelfPortrait of Somaliland:
Rebuilding from the Ruins is the title of the results of this research. The first draft was
published in November 1999. Over 300 copies were distributed to representatives of
national and local government, members of civil society, professionals, intellectuals, and
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Elders, who were invited to a meeting in Hargeisa at which feedback was solicited. Based
on the feedback from the meeting and on inputs received formally and informally by
written and verbal means, the research team rewrote the document. The second draft was
printed and 300 copies were again distributed in January 2000 to government, civil
society organizations, and international organizations. It was also distributed to some of
the communities where the focus groups had been conducted to solicit their feedback on
the document.
Out of the research and discussion four Entry Points emerged. These are broad themes
that have been identified as priorities for research. (The researchers said they were
surprised by the themes, because they had assumed that the people’s priorities would
include health, education, water, and other social services  the sectors usually addressed
by international organizations.) Under each of these themes, three subthemes were
identified. The themes and subthemes and the locations where the workshops have been
or are to be held are as follows:
Media
Objectivity and Responsibility  Borama
Coverage and Influence  Borao
Media Environment  Hargeisa
Governance
Decentralization  Beki
Taxation  Erigavo
Representation  Hargeisa
Livestock Regulation
Marketing  Borao
Health and Export Markets  Berbera
Environment  Odeweyne
Family
Impact of War  Sheikh
Impact of qaat  Gabiley
Institutional Support Systems  Hargeisa
Working Groups of professionals and stakeholders in each theme were formed. The
Working Groups meet monthly in Hargeisa. The WSP researcher responsible for each
theme is responsible for preparing a Discussion Paper that establishes a framework for
future workshops based on the initial research and inputs from the Working Group. The
Working Group provides feedback to the researcher who then makes changes, and back
and forth it goes until an agreement is reached. The paper is then ready for the Thematic
Workshop, where it is distributed to participants. The Discussion Paper is intended to
catalyze discussion, frame the main issues, and identify key questions.
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Before a workshop the researcher visits the community where it is to be held and
identifies an anchorperson to be responsible for identifying participants. The process must
adapt to local contexts. For example, in Burco, a polarized community comprised of two
clans, it was necessary to utilize two anchor persons  from each of the two main clans
living there.
The anchorperson is given a list of the categories of segments of the population who
should be represented. These include members of civil society, local government officials,
Elders, women’s groups, and representatives of the relevant stakeholder groups, for
example livestock wholesalers, retailers, and producers.
Workshops are generally comprised of about 20 participants. They are also generally
attended by members of the research team and one or two representatives of the national
government, who answer communities’ questions about national processes and take the
findings of the workshops to the Guurti and Parliament, respectively. (These individuals
were chosen by these bodies to represent them in the workshops.) The first workshop was
held in May 2000. It is anticipated that the final workshop will be conducted in April
2001. At the time that this research was carried out, one workshop had been held on each
of the four themes. The second workshop on the theme of the impact of qaat was held
during the research period.
The general process followed by the workshops is to use the first day for “venting”, the
second day for identifying issues, setting the agenda, and discussing alternatives, and the
last day is to propose recommendations for addressing. Each evening during the
workshop the team meets to summarize the day’s discussion and write the main points on
flipcharts. The following day the flipcharts are shared with the participants. In addition,
the team meets afterwards in Hargeisa to discuss the lessons learned about the process, so
that it can be modified for subsequent workshops.
Strengths
Sustainability
One of the goals of WSP in both Somalia and Somaliland has been to institutionalize the
PAR process by “handing it over” to a local organization. In Somaliland, the organization
is an existing research center, the Somaliland Center for Peace and Development (SCPD).
WSP and SCPD together have put together a group of researchers who represent some of
Somaliland’s best and brightest. Most have returned to Somaliland from abroad to
contribute to rebuilding their country. SCPD hopes to establish itself as a permanent
institute that will be involved in research, training, documentation, publication, and
dissemination. WSP and SCPD are generally conflated by Somalilanders.
Staffing
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Not only is WSP’s staff (both in Nairobi and in Somaliland) comprised of Somaliland’s
brain trust, they work well together as a team. Staff members exhibit a sense of pride in
being a member of the team as well as pride in and commitment to the work in which
they are engaged. Each of the main clan families (Isaq, Darod, Dir) of Somaliland are
represented on the staff. They appear to enjoy a considerable degree of respect from and
the trust of those who have participated in the program. One government official said, “I
trust the products (the SelfPortrait of Somaliland) because I trust the people on the
research team to write the opinions of workshop participants, rather than their own
opinions.”
The Process
Almost without exception, individuals who participated in the WSP workshops reported
positively about the process. The fact that they are paid to participate may skew the
responses. Members of the Working Groups are not paid to participate, however, and they
too were also unanimous in their positive statements about the process. A government
official said, “The process is different, but better, than traditional processes since
everyone, including women, are present and have an opportunity to speak. The process
acknowledges local authorities by giving them a chance to speak, but does not let them
monopolize the discussion.”
Almost all participants in the workshops said that this was the first time they had had the
opportunity to sit down with representatives of national and local government and
representatives of every segment of society to discuss issues of common concern. This
experience seems to have been empowering for all types of participants, including the
MPs and members of the Guurti themselves.
The Products
The SelfPortrait of Somaliland and the anticipated Entry Point Papers will be significant
accomplishments in and of themselves and should benefit national and local governments
and international organizations, since they not only provide summaries of key discussions
held at the workshops, but also analyses and syntheses of the key issues.
A member of a women’s group said that not only did the process contribute to a better
understanding of different groups’ points of view in her own community, but that the
SelfPortrait of Somaliland contributed to a better understanding of the points of view
from different parts of Somaliland.”
Utilization of Lessons Learned
At both the international, Nairobi, and Hargeisa levels, WSP engages in an iterative
process of action and reflection. In Somaliland, program staff were quick to incorporate
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lessons learned and adapt program approaches and activities accordingly. Some of these
are discussed elsewhere in this paper.
Weaknesses
Lack of understanding of the process
There was considerable confusion about the purpose of the program. Women in one focus
group said that they did not think that the program had had the impact that they had
expected, because they had expected that the program would also do something about the
problems. They also said that the recommendations that they made during the first phase
had not been responded to (these were related to the need for hospitals and schools).
Women in another focus group said, “We expected something to result from the
workshop. We wanted the government to take the recommendations from the workshop
and translate them into action that would benefit women in tangible ways.” Such a
response indicates a lack of an understanding of the purpose of the process. This is not
surprising given the traditional activities of aid organizations in Somalia and Somaliland.
Lack of Coordination with other international organizations in Somaliland The lack of
coordination with other organizations, especially those doing similar work, has added to
the confusion about WSP’s purpose, since on several occasions, WSP and the Life and
Peace Institute (LPI) have offered workshops in the same locations during the same time
period. WSP has also lost opportunities for increasing the impact of the program. For
example, in Puntland, WSP worked with UNESCO’s “Radio of Peace” Program to
disseminate WSP’s findings over the radio, thereby reaching not only literate, but
illiterate, populations, as well as a larger number of people for a fraction of the cost. This
has not happened between WSP and other organizations in Hargeisa. (WSP is however
videotaping portions of the workshops. These have been shared with the Working Groups
as part of the preparation for subsequent workshops and have the potential to reach
broader audiences as well.)
Payment of Participants
WSP acknowledged that they had spent considerable time debating the dubious merits of
paying participants per diem for attending the workshops. This generates some conflict as
individuals and groups compete to participate in the workshops in order to receive the per
diem. (It also may have created a conflict of interest when meeting with this author.)
Slow Feedback or Lack of Feedback to and from Communities
One participant in the initial phase of the research complained that their community had
never received copies of the SelfPortrait of Somaliland. One member of the government
who was a participant in the meeting called to review the first draft of the SelfPortrait of
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Somaliland complained that their feedback was not incorporated in the final paper. A
participant in the media workshop said that the products should be disseminated to more
than just the government and international organizations and those workshop papers
should be distributed more rapidly and more widely.
Validity of the Research
Depending on an evaluator’s epistemological preferences, there may be concerns about
the validity of the research. One international consultant expressed the following concerns
about the validity of the research, “First the number of participants is not significant, and
second is that equal weight is given to all participants.” From this author’s perspective,
the validity of the research is not especially problematic. Indeed, given the context, both
the number of participants and the participant selection process, strengthen the validity of
the research.
Admittedly, the products of the research determine which issues get emphasized, which
ones get ignored, what information on various issues is presented, and which viewpoints
are presented more convincingly. As such WSP and SCPD have a considerable influence
over which voices and which viewpoints are heard by both internal and external actors.
Paradoxes
Neutrality versus Advocacy
The UNDP Resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia,
Randolph Kent, pointed out that WSP suffers from a paradox worldwide. “In postconflict
situations one has governments that are inherently incapable and communities that are by
definition either antagonistic or linked to the government. The program claims to
represent the community, but what community does it represent when there is no
community? How can the program claim communication between communities and
government when the project requires the buyin of the government for implementation,
requires that communities communicate honestly with the government, and at the same
time the government does not tolerate criticism. In other words middle level dialogue
could not exist without the consent of the government. And if the middle level is not in
sync with the government, then the government will not give its consent, and if operates
without the government's consent then the program does not fulfill its mandate and
becomes an advocacy project.”
Menkhaus (2000) writes about WSP Puntland, “The very process WSP set in motion was
anything but neutral, and was not in any way perceived as neutral locally. Creating space
for broadbased dialogue had real political implications locally, creating winners and
losers, benefiting some groups and threatening others.” In Somaliland, WSP’s research
team appears to be closer to attainment of this quixotic goal.
http://www.mbali.info/doc126.htm

25/43

11/1/2016

Impact Evaluation of The WarTorn Societies Project: Somaliland

However one perspective that does not seem to have been given voice is the one that
questions the sovereignty of Somaliland itself. WSP Puntland was asked to address this
issue  from the other side  and it, wisely, declined to do so. It may indeed be wise to
skirt the issue in Somaliland as well. First, because the project would be shut down by the
government if it was perceived in any way to be promoting reunification. Secondly,
because Somalilanders are tired of conflict and many do not want to address the issue
themselves  especially not until Somalia gets itself together. Many said that after so many
years of war they would pay any price for peace.
The Need to Strengthen Government and Civil Society
Another of the inherent paradoxes in the process is that in order to accomplish its goals of
postconflict state building, the program must seek to simultaneously strengthen both the
government and civil society. This paradox has had an impact on local perceptions of the
program. In Puntland, there was a perception that WSP was aligned with the opposition,
while in Somaliland there is a perception that WSP is aligned with the government. A
challenge confronting the program is to convince both government and civil society of the
necessity of the other for building a sustainable state and a sustainable peace.
Local Ownership versus International Community Participation
One of the stated goals of WSP internationally is to improve external aid agencies work in
postconflict societies. Menkhaus (2000) writes, “The Geneva office has maintained a
strong commitment to this, while WSP Nairobi has striven to grant as much autonomy as
possible to local offices. This has enhanced the sense of ownership of those communities
to the program. It also allowed local communities to come together without the
distractions of external actors to find their own voice and heal their own wounds. This
was especially important in view of the perception that the external agencies are as much
a part of the problem as they are a part of the solution. The Geneva office on the other
hand was concerned that this marginalized the external organizations who, along with
local authorities and civil society organizations, were the target beneficiaries of the
program.”
Nevertheless, the lack of collaboration with the international community represents a lost
opportunity to increase the impact of the program. Both WSP and the international
community have contributed to this state of affairs (these are discussed in more detail
elsewhere). One international organization official, said that one reason for the low
participation of decisionmaking staff from international organizations in WSP workshops
is due to the fact that the logistical constraints were not well thought out in designing the
program. These constraints include the staff time entailed, the expenses entailed, and
expatriates’ lack of Somali language capacity. Although not knowing the Somali language
prevents expatriates from being fullfledged participants in the process, the experience of
observing workshops (with a translator) is valuable in and of itself as it enables the
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observer to get a sense of the multiple perspectives and issues surrounding a given topic,
as well as to learn which groups in a community propose which courses of action.
On the one hand, this is especially valuable since the programming of international
organizations would benefit from being informed about the different perspectives of
different groups on given issues and the probable winners and losers of different policies
and programs. This is something that WSP is wellplaced to do. A UNDP official
expressed some frustration at feeling that SCPD “keeps to themselves” in order to
maintain the Somali perspective, because he would like to have them influencing his
programming.
On the other hand, the past experiences with international interveners have generally been
disempowering for Somalilanders. Ownership of the program  both the products and the
processes  by Somalilanders is one of the program’s greatest strengths. The lack of
involvement of expatriates has provided Somalilanders the space to reach a consensus
among themselves before attempting to have an impact on the policies and programming
of international organizations.
Finally, the presence of internationals in workshops, given the potential resources that
they represent, may have a distorting impact on the kinds of issues that emerge, as well as
discouraging Somalilanders to think about the resources already available to them.
That might encourage Somalilanders to determine which are the critical resources to
which Somaliland does not have access, and approach donors for only those resources.
Nevertheless, international organizations will continue to implement programs with or
without being included in the WSP process. They will continue inadvertently to create
winners and losers and promote the needs and interests of some groups over those of
others, and inadvertently to generate conflict as a result. A consequence of the low level
of participation by international organizations is that WSP may actually have less of an
impact than it has to potential to have.
Impact: Six Dimensions of Interest
Economic Sources
The WSP is a new type of program in Somaliland, and PAR is a new kind of process. It
does not contribute directly to economic development and it does not bring significant
monetary or material gain (either legitimate or illicit) other than several salaries and
negligible per diems for a few hundred people. As such, it is generally misunderstood and
not always appreciated. Indeed, some Somalilanders have nicknamed WSP “the Blah
Blah Project”. (On the positive side, this has reduced the conflict generated for access to
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resources made available by the program, which is an all too common result of assistance
programs.)
Some international experts also criticized the program. One internationally renown
conflict resolution expert said, “The problem with this kind of project (as opposed to
infrastructure projects for example) is that they provide a way for the international
community to avoid the responsibility of transferring wealth from the rich global North to
the poor global South. Economic development is a precondition of peace, and this type of
project does not address the economic causes of the conflict. The international community
is instead putting money in low budget conflict resolution projects that don’t leave
anything behind, certainly not food on the table”.
The leader of a local NGO reported, “Conflicts in Somaliland are resourcebased. They
used to be about access to water and grazing and now they are about access to capital.
This is interconnected with politics. Not everyone feels that they are getting their fair
share. Peace has to be approached from two sides. One is through the Elders and the
Guurti who have been successful in resolving conflicts such as the one in Burco. The
other has to be through employment generation. That is why the lack of involvement of
foreign donors in WSP is a weakness of WSP. Another weakness is that it does not
address the real economic issues.”
Other Somalilanders interviewed for this paper especially those who had participated in
the workshops  suggested that those who claimed that the program did not address
economic issues do not understand the program, or in the case of expatriates, do not
understand Somaliland.
That unequal distribution of resources (as they pertain to groups rather than to
individuals) is more an issue for Somalilanders than absolute scarcity has already been
discussed. This is something that expatriates do not always grasp  appalled as it were by
the apparent material poverty of the place. In addition, because expatriates do not always
understand the complexities of the society, they do understand how programs and projects
that appear evenhanded or appear to benefit the most vulnerable, can be manipulated to
create winners and losers that reinforce existing relationships. By increasing the
awareness of international organizations in this regard, WSP has the potential to make
significant contributions to reconciliation and conflict prevention. It is a weakness of
WSP in Somaliland (and Nairobi and Puntland as well) that it has chosen not to actively
engage with international organizations. (This was a tradeoff that was made self
consciously. The advantages and disadvantages of which has been discussed elsewhere.)
Nevertheless WSP has and will make contributions to reconciliation and conflict
prevention in other ways. The PAR process provides space for those who seldom have 
many participants said they had never had  the opportunity to voice their concerns
directly to national officials. In some case this has and will contribute to changes in public
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policy, in others it has not or will not. Regardless of whether the beneficiaries are
Somalilanders or expatriates, both the processes and the products tackle some difficult
issues head on.
For example, the workshop on livestock marketing in Burco, which may be one of the
most unstable towns in Somaliland, addressed the issue of the system of gadbad iyo neef.
This system is practiced by the big livestock exporters (who are also big staple goods
importers). Instead of purchasing livestock for export from middlemen with cash, they
pay for the livestock with staple goods that they have imported. However the issue was
raised at the workshop that instead of giving the goods to the middlemen at market value,
they give them the goods at inflated prices. Because a few powerful traders have a
monopoly of the market, there is little that the middlemen can do to change the current
arrangements.
This workshop was attended by national and local officials, livestock export middlemen,
and livestock producers, among others. Very powerful traders were also invited, but they
did not attend, reportedly because they knew they would be targeted for complaint.
Ideally, had they attended, the workshop might have resulted in a discussion of
alternatives in which all stakeholders could have found “winwin” alternatives. As it was
at least national and local officials had an opportunity to learn about issues of importance
to some of their constituents. Whether or not that will result in policies aimed at
regulating the gadbad iyo neef system remains to be seen.
Another contribution of both the workshops and the products of the PAR process is that
they promote citizens’ understanding of the difficult choices and tradeoffs that the
government must make everyday in its effort to govern in a context of extremely scarce
resources. For example the choice between spending money to maintain a military in
order to maintain the peace and security, versus spending it to rehabilitate the port in
Berbera. Citizens need to understand these choices and determine their own priorities and
communicate these priorities to the government.
By convening Somalilanders representing different perspectives to look at these issues
from all sides promotes critical thinking about economic development issues. And as
discussed elsewhere in this report, there are advantages to be gained from providing
Somalilanders the opportunity to arrive at a consensus around economic development
before they engage in dialogues with international organizations. As one representative of
a civil society organization said, “international organization development projects are few
and far between and they are part of the problem rather than the solution. One problem is
that the government needs to act like a government. It needs to have a clear program and
dictate the terms to the international organizations.”
A WSP staff member said, “The program addresses peace building by addressing
economic and social development. It enables internal and external actors to reach a
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common understanding and helps to avoid interventions that feed the conflict in a
situation where central authority is not strong and therefore there is little accountability on
the part of external actors. The research comes with recommendations with relevance for
rebuilding, which external actors can translate into action.” To this end the products
themselves can make a significant contribution to donors understanding of the issues and
different perspectives on the issues.
Some expatriate staff of international organizations in Nairobi suggested that the inclusion
of expatriates in the workshops encourages the “culture of dependency”. Years of
development assistance to the Somali Democratic Republic did encourage middle and
upper level actors to look first to international organizations to meet development needs.
However the low level of assistance that has been provided to Somaliland by international
organizations during the past decade has served to offset this phenomena, and has
encouraged citizens not only to set priorities, but to create alternative means for meeting
development needs.
Menkhaus (2000) in an evaluation of WSP Puntland notes, “Interviewees stressed that
thirty years of very centralized rule of the Barre regime coupled with decades of topdown
development aid meant that local populations had almost no experience contemplating,
prioritizing, and operationalizing regional development. Nor did they possess a clear
understanding of what external aid agencies would and would not do for them.” This view
was voiced by WSP participants in Somaliland as well. In the workshop in Gabiley, when
some individuals suggested that international organizations would fund a proposal, others
would provide a “reality check” with the question, “What if they don’t? How else could
funding be obtained for that proposal?”
However, an example of a process in which WSP did not participate and that some felt
would have benefited from WSP participation involved UNDP’s Sectoral Committees.
These were to have been organized by the Ministry of Planning as part of the planning
process for the Five Year Plan, but were to have involved government ministries and
international organizations working in particular sectors. As it turned out they were
organized by UNDP. One UNDP official said, “WSP has not been involved in these.
There is no doubt that it has been a donor driven process. However WSP participation
might enabled it to be put back into Somali hands. In Nairobi, there was a need to get
Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) buyin early on, but this did not happen and
SACB has marginalized WSP. WSP would bring valueadded to the Sectoral Committees
and to the SACB since they have their ear to the ground. The Area Program Coordinator
has a monthly meeting  which the UN heads it in the morning and the international
NGOs head it in the afternoon. WSP is invited, but does not attend.” One reason for this
may be related to WSP Somaliland’s primary identity as SCPD, which is registered with
the government as a local NGO rather than an international NGO.
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InterGroup Relationships Perhaps WSP’s greatest contribution towards improving inter
group relationships, is that it has demonstrated that there are constructive ways to address
conflict  and that indeed conflict can be constructive. Although the WSP process is not
conflict resolution training per se, it is an educational process that looks more like
Freireian participatory consciousnessraising approaches, than like conventional training
approaches. The dialogue process demonstrates that there are ways of settling differences
and solving problems that do not involve the suppression of dissent or resort to the gun.
The WSP gives legitimacy to discussions about intercommunal violence by reframing the
discussion in terms of issues rather than in terms of identities. By focusing on issues
rather than identities, participants perceive their needs and interests as being associated
with categories of identity other than clan. As discussed elsewhere, WSP has revealed that
there are overlapping cleavages in Somaliland society between individuals with more
traditional worldviews and those with more Westernized or synthetic worldviews. By
focusing on issues, these worldview conflicts become more readily apparent.
In some instances this has generated some conflict. For example one man from Sheikh
who participated in the workshop there pertaining to the impact of the war on the family
said, “Many men at the workshop felt that WSP was trying to undermine their role.
People from Hargeisa have different ideas than we do. But they convinced us that they
were not trying to undermine us. The workshop helped us to better understand each
other’s point of view. That is because the process was based on mutual respect.” Another
participant in the workshop in Sheikh, a member of a local NGO, pointed out that, “Inter
group relationships are not something that can be changed in one workshop alone. There
is a need to hold many workshops over a period of time. Maybe WSP staff should provide
training of trainers so that local communities can learn how to conduct such dialogues
themselves.”
WSP has made a conscious effort to include the voices of all clans in its processes and its
products. During the first phase of the research, WSP held focus groups with members of
all of the clans of Somaliland, and by the end of the second phase will have held
workshops in locations in which most, but not all, clans traditionally reside. In relation to
clan relationships, however, a significant vote of confidence in WSP personnel was made
by a government official who is a member of a minority clan that has suffered
discrimination at the hands of the main clan families of both Somaliland and Somalia,
who said “As a Tumaale I generally prefer working with expatriates over Somalis.
Expatriates are “clanblind” and do not discriminate against people on the basis of clan.
An exception is the group of individuals who work at SCPD. I trust them to treat all clans
equally as they go about doing their work.”
However, like all activities in Somaliland, where per diems are to be paid, WSP has
generated some conflict in communities over the issue of participation in the workshops.
In Gabiley (a small town in which there are three Consortia of Women’s NGOs) some
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women’s NGOs were invited by the local authorities and others were not, which created
some rancor on the part of those who were not invited. In Sheikh, WSP initially requested
that the Mayor select participants, which he did. However when he was replaced, the new
Mayor was unhappy about the selections. WSP resolved the issue keeping half of the old
Mayor’s selections and asking the new Mayor to select the other half. This turn of events
probably made for a much more representative group of participants. However, WSP
learned from this lesson, and preparations for subsequent workshops included hiring a
local “anchor person” to identify workshop participants.
Mobilization
In the longterm WSP’s greatest contribution may be to the mobilization of nonclanbased
identity groups in Somaliland. Nevertheless, a WSP researcher emphasized that “the role
of WSP is not that of community mobilization. Not only would that role get WSP in
trouble with the government, Somaliland is not at that stage in the statebuilding process.
The role of WSP is to facilitate communication between the people and the government.”
There is general consensus that WSP has had a catalytic effect on civil society, which
some international organizations in Nairobi said made the program valuable in and of
itself. A member of the media Working Group emphasized that, “The process is the first
time that the media has had an open discussion with members of the national government
about both the media and the government’s roles, rights and responsibilities, and had it
published in a book”. She added, “the media workshop in Borama showed that there is a
need for dialogue between the media and communities as well. Under the Somali
Democratic Republic the media was an arm of the government, so there is a need to build
trust between communities and the media. The community where the workshop was held
did not envision the possibility that it could communicate with the media and that the
media can communicate news that is about and for the people.”
The workshop also demonstrated that there is a need for the media to obtain and report
the news from rural areas as well as from urban areas, so that rural areas can
communicate their interests and needs through the media to decisionmakers. Members of
the media at the workshop took the opportunity to encourage community members to pass
information to the media and to give interviews to the media.
A cornerstone of WSP elsewhere has been its focus on the role of civil society in giving
voice to local communities in determining priorities for reconstruction. Civil society does
not mean the same in Somaliland as it does in the West or elsewhere. It is encouraging to
note that the individuals and groups who have adopted that nomenclature and participated
in WSP workshops as its representatives, appeared to come from the middle levels, if not
the grassroots, of society. Not too long ago these individuals and groups would have
primarily been members of the elite who had appropriated the term to gain access to the
resources made available to civil society by the international community.
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The process has also contributed to the mobilization of peripheral towns and rural areas
by enabling them to articulate their issues visavis the national government, to members
of that government, in a way that was empowering because it was afforded legitimacy.
This is perhaps the first building block in the process of facilitating disempowered groups
to mobilize on their own behalf. As Menkhaus (2000) writes of WSP Puntland, “Though
essentially an elite exercise, WSP expanded local dialogue beyond the elite level. Politics
and development are normally the domain of a relatively small group of leaders.... By
holding the workshops in small towns and inviting nomads, fishermen, and other “non
elite” members of society to participate, the WSP team broadened political participation
in a significant way.”
A participant in the workshop in Sheikh said, “people in Sheikh feel neglected by the
central government  and Sheikh is populated primarily by Isaq, and is only two hours on
a paved road from Hargeisa  so we can imagine how towns in other parts of Somaliland
feel. But the WSP workshop reminded us that we have something to say.”
WSP also empowered intellectuals a category employed by Somalis to refer to individuals
educated to the secondary or university levels. Many of these individuals hold technical
degrees from abroad in fields such as medicine, engineering, and agricultural science.
These individuals were marginalized both by the former government which made
appointments based on clan rather than merit, and during the war, when the key to
survival was the gun rather than the diploma. WSP brings these individuals into the policy
process and enables them to contribute their expertise to statebuilding and
reconstruction, through participation in the Working Groups, and through hiring them as
resource people to facilitate the workshops and to write the workshops reports.
The program has contributed to mobilizing and empowering women by articulating
issues, that have previously been considered private concerns (e.g., the impact of qaat), as
public concerns at the local and national levels. Even more empowering is to have had
those concerns be placed on the local and national agendas. It was reported that the day
after the workshop on the impact of qaat on the family ended in Gabiley, the Mayor made
a speech in which he discussed the need for measures to address the problem of qaat. The
workshop also brought local and national scrutiny to bear on producers, traders, and users
of qaat. A WSP researcher said, Gabiley is the “Minnesota” of Somaliland. If something
is an issue in Gabiley it is likely to be an issue everywhere. If the Mayor of Gabiley
declared that qaat is a problem that must be addressed, then qaat is more likely to be
viewed as a problem in the rest of Somaliland.”
The integration of women’s concerns into the SelfPortrait of Somaliland  without
labeling them as women’s concerns or putting them in a separate pamphlet  makes a
considerable contribution to mainstreaming women’s issues. Equally important, WSP is
contributing to positive culture change by adding to the critical mass of women who have
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experience participating in public dialogues  and the mass of men getting accustomed to
women doing so.
One component of mobilization involves capacity building, and WSP has reportedly
made contributions in this regard as well. A staff member of an international NGO said,
“One indicator of the success of this process is that one can see more strategic planning,
and more organized, more formalized ways of doing things among my local colleagues
these days. When I point it out, I discover that the person has attended an LPI or WSP
workshop”.
A highranking government official said that “The WSP process is extremely empowering
to participants. Traditional processes have always been vertical as well as horizontal,
because any man to speak out at meetings and this is how people’s voices are heard up
and down the chain. However the WSP process is new in that it brings together all
stakeholders in a given sector at the same time and at the same place, and enables them to
talk directly to each other about issues related to that sector.”
Public Institutions and Processes
The WSP process is focused less on horizontal relationships between elite and middle
level actors, and more on vertical relationships between elites, middle level, and
grassroots leadership. This approach appears to have been effective in enhancing the
understanding of each other’s points of view, among different groups in the society. An
MP who has participated in workshops in the regions, said that the experience of visiting
other regions and listening to the views expressed by those communities has been an eye
opener for him. A member of the Guurti, who participated in the workshop in the village
of Beki, said that he had never visited such a remote place, and that he was surprised to
hear from the community that it considers the central government to be an obstacle. “The
community asked me why the government is dragging its feet on implementation of
decentralization. I had to explain to them that the government is reluctant for two reasons.
First, because it is fighting to preserve the integrity of Somaliland. Second, because it is
unable to extend its authority throughout the Somaliland territory  it really only has
authority over Hargeisa and Gabiley.”
As discussed elsewhere, the questions of how far to go with decentralization and how to
go about it, are among the most, if not the most, challenging ones facing Somaliland at
this stage in the statebuilding process. A government official who participated in the
workshop in Beki described the discussion that occurred there. “The people in Beki are
not happy about the fact that the central government appoints their DC. In Beki it seems
that just when the community has gotten to know an official and established a working
relationship with them, and just when an official has gotten to know the community and
to understand their needs, the central government replaces them. There is a flip side”, said
the official, “If they chose their own officials, even in a small place like Beki, there are
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two main families and they will both want a DC who is closer to their family.” The role of
WSP in this situation was simply to educate people  using the WSP PAR process  about
their rights and responsibilities visavis local and national government. WSP was careful
not to suggest any specific course of action.
Another issue that has been a topic of discussion in WSP workshops is the fact that some
communities in the regions do not feel that their representatives in the Guurti and the
Parliament represent their interests. They feel that their representatives are more focused
on the power politics of the center, at the expense of the needs and interests of the regions,
thus further marginalizing of these regions.
Taxation is another complex issue that has been tackled by WSP. A WSP researcher
explained, “Most Somalilanders  including the tax collectors themselves  due to past
experience with an extortionist government, do not understand the concept of taxation.
They understand bribes, but not taxes. They do not understand government’s and citizens’
rights and responsibilities in terms of taxation.” He continued, “Who can offer that kind
of training? Not the government and not ordinary citizens. Only a “neutral” institution
like WSP can provide it”.
WSP has generated some conflict by increasing the voice of civil society in Somaliland,
but it appears to be a constructive conflict. A senior ministry official said that from the
perspective of the government, the process provides too much voice to communities and
not enough to the government. He continued, “Although the SelfPortrait of Somaliland
did not tell the government anything that it did not already know, it is helpful to have the
perspective of the community written in a book to support policy decisions. It would be
more useful to the communities if it also reflected the government‘s perspective.”
Ahmed Farah explained, “In Somaliland the government was initially ambivalent towards
the program. On the one hand, they liked it because it gave them access to civil society
and the grassroots, on the other hand they recognized it as a powerful process, were afraid
of that process, and wanted to control that process. This is especially true when the
program addresses issues related to governance.” However, an MP praised the project
saying that it carries power from the center to the margins and is contributing towards an
understanding that governance is not comprised only of ministers and members of
parliament. The project gives people a chance to communicate with the government, and
it gives the government a chance to show people that government can be good for them.”
Both the research process and the research product are being employed in the process of
state building. The MPs and members of the Guurti who are their houses’ representatives
to WSP workshops, report back to their houses’ at each session. In this way, Parliament
and the Guurti learn about the findings of WSP’s PAR. The Self Portrait of Somaliland is
reported to have served as a baseline document to both the Ministry of Planning during
the development of the Five Year Plan, and to the Parliament in its current deliberations
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pertaining to the drafting of the Constitution. Both the decentralization and the media
workshops are reported to have had some impact on the wording in the second draft of the
provisional constitution. The legislature was in session and they were working on drafting
the constitution when the workshops took place. The findings of the workshops and the
perspectives of participants were reported back to the Parliament and the Guurti and some
of the recommended changes were incorporated.
During a Media Working Group meeting, an MP who is a member of the Working Group
reportedly asked participants how the Constitution should be changed, saying “This is still
a draft and we can still change it.” A civil societybased member of the Media Working
Group said, “The constitution calls for freedom of the press, but at the same time there
was interference from the government, including the shutting down of Jamhuriya (an
independent newspaper that had printed some criticism of the government).” Since the
workshop Jamhuriya has experienced less government harassment. For its part, Jamhuriya
staff (who were at the workshop) have behaved more responsibly and has learned how to
focus more on issues and less on personalities.” But, she acknowledged, this was also a
result of a BBC sponsored training for the media which addressed these issues.
Somaliland has a government newspaper, Mandeeq, which along with Radio Hargeisa,
serve as vehicles for government. Members of the media would like to have an
independent radio station, but do not have the resources to purchase one themselves.
A consultant for an international organization suggested that WSP’s most important
contribution will be the development of a sustainable SCPD. “There is a need for
longterm thinking on the issues that are currently tackled by WSP and there is a need for
an institution that will do so.” However, a senior ministry official did not like the fact that
SCPD was registered as an NGO rather than as a research institution. He said, “There is a
need for such an institution to inform policy and provide training to the government.
Such an institution should be independent from the government, but have a collaborative
relationship with government.” He also acknowledged that the government does not at
this time have the capacity to carry out the type of research that produced the SelfPortrait
of Somaliland.
The reservations of the government are related to the fact that NGOs have more resources
than the government. Therefore the best and the brightest go to work for NGOs rather
than for the government. The international consultant reported that the Ministry of
Planning has expressed consternation about its lack of capacity and its need for training
about the processes of planning and evaluation. Such training is therefore a much needed
service that an institution such as the SCPD could provide to the government.
WSP is in some ways more threatening to local governments than it is to the national
government, and it has encountered some resistance from local governments. The Mayor
of Sheikh was uncomfortable with WSP’s role of facilitating communication between the
http://www.mbali.info/doc126.htm

36/43

11/1/2016

Impact Evaluation of The WarTorn Societies Project: Somaliland

community and the national government, because he felt they were attempting to usurp
his role. “According to the Constitution,” he said, “the role of local government is to take
the concerns of the community to the national government. The local government knows
the community and knows what the community needs and can inform the national
government”.
Political Leaders and Public Behavior
The WSP PAR process of local consultation has had an impact on the programming
approaches of some international organizations, who have seen its appropriateness to
Somaliland and its effectiveness as a process. For example, the Human Rights Officer for
the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, plans to employ a process modeled on WSP’s
PAR to elicit answers to such questions as: What are local conceptions of justice? What
are local conceptions of human rights? What are local conceptions about what constitutes
a war crime? What are local conceptions about what constitutes a human rights violation?
These are important questions that have arisen in other contexts, such as South Africa, but
the answers are not easy to get at through more conventional research methods. WSP’s
PAR model promises to contribute to answers since the answers emerge through the
dialogue as participants struggle with the questions themselves.
A WSP staff member reported that some Puntlanders who attended the Arta Conference
informed him that the impact of WSP on the representatives of civil society at the Arta
Conference is apparent. These individuals who had participated in WSP workshops,
talked about the rights and responsibilities of the government and the citizenry, and about
the importance of consulting with communities in reconstruction planning. An expatriate
staff member from an international NGO agreed that the cumulative impact of programs
such as WSP, LPI, and Horn Afric, (LPI implements civic education and other programs
throughout Somaliland and Somalia, while Horn Afrik is based in Mogadishu) is an
increasingly sophisticated discourse around civil society. He also stated that it was
obvious at the Arta Conference that Somalis are no longer willing to accept top down
governance.
Internal and External Circumstances Affecting Impact
The International Community in Nairobi and Somalia
For a number of different reasons, WSP made the decision, first in Puntland and then in
Somaliland, to disengage from the international community, and focus on programs and
goals related to local processes. There were a number of sound reasons for this decision,
some philosophical and others practical. One was that during most of the life of the
program, the international community in Nairobi has been characterized by bureaucratic
turf wars and counterproductive competition.
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In an evaluation of WSP Puntland, Menkhaus (2000) writes, “Relationships between the
UN and the EU/Somalia Unit (the major donor to Somalia) were extremely poor; power
struggles and personality clashes within the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB)
were also endemic; and rivalries within the UN agencies themselves were fierce. All this
was fueled by dramatically shrinking pools of foreign aid for Somalia and a fundamental
lack of consensus about how to channel assistance into a zone of state collapse. Prospects
for interagency cooperation were thus virtually nonexistent. WSP could hardly have
stepped into an environment less conducive for the purpose of encouraging reflection,
selfcriticism, and innovation in international rehabilitation aid.”
In Somaliland, for example, SACB attempted to establish a SubOffice. One official from
an international organization reported, “At the time the EU did not have a person in
Somaliland and therefore they did not participate in the process of setting it up. When the
EU did put someone in Somaliland, they felt they had not been consulted about the
process and therefore they side swiped the initiative.” These circumstances have not
helped WSP to advocate changes in the practices of international aid agencies.
A UNDP official said that WSP had highlighted the fact that the lack of the participation
of Somalis in designing assistance programs has been a serious problem to date. UNDP is
preparing the Human Development Report for Somalia that will be published in 2002.
The official said that UNDP recognizes that what is missing from the report is the Somali
perspective and would like to be able to collaborate with SCPD to fill this gap. These
reports address the themes of poverty eradication and capacity building in governance.
UNDP would like a Somali partner such as SCPD to advise, criticize, help correct and
help focus the work, provide analysis, and make proposals.
A source of frustration for WSP with the international community is that different
organizations  and sometimes different individuals within the same organization  have
different expectations of WSP. Representatives from these organizations have suggested
the following roles for WSP and/or SCPD: (1) inform their own policies and
programming; (2) serve as an evaluative mechanism for existing projects; (3) provide a
source of information about the political process; (4) act as a contributor to the political
process, (5) serve as a documentation center; (6) serve as an information clearinghouse;
and (7) act in an advisory capacity as a think tank.
Arta Conference
The Arta Conference, held in Djibouti between May and August 2000, is the thirteenth
national conference since Siyad Barre’s ouster, but it appears to have gotten further along
the road towards establishing a government than previous ones. Farah (2000) writes, “In
spite of its flaws, the Arta conference differs from the past reconciliation efforts in several
important ways. First, previous efforts allowed faction leaders to play a central role, while
the Arta conference widened the process by engaging civil society, traditional leaders,
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business class, and religious leaders in the process. This has angered leaders of the de
facto political entities in northern Somalia who thought that they were ignored and their
achievements not considered, nevertheless it made the process more representative and
Somali driven. The number of participants increased from an initial 1000 to about 2000
persons comprising official and unofficial delegates representing different sectors of the
Somali population and the diaspora.” However, there is also much about this new
government that does not promote reconciliation  within Somalia or with Somaliland 
including the fact that the new President served as Minister of the Interior and Deputy
Prime Minister under Siyad Barre and that among the MPs are two of Barre’s former
military officers (Morgan and Ganni) who had responsibility for the destruction of
Somaliland, and after Barre’s ouster the destruction of the Bay and Bakool Regions.
This conference has created a considerable amount of uneasiness in Somaliland, the
sources of which are both internal and external. There is little doubt that pressure will be
exerted from certain groups inside Somaliland and from outside Somaliland to reunite
with Somalia once its government is securely in place. This poses a considerable threat to
the Somaliland government. In fact, on his return from Djibouti in September, a
Somaliland clan leader, who was elected to the newly formed Somali Transitional
National Assembly at the Conference, was sentenced to seven years imprisonment after
he was found guilty of high treason by a Berbera court. He was subsequently released and
pardoned by Egal, in response to pressure from international human rights organizations
and residents of his hometown. This incident serves to highlight the perception of the
Somaliland authorities that the Arta Conference poses both internal and external threats to
the sovereignty of Somalland.
Recommendations
(1) The effectiveness of WSP would be enhanced if WSP were to find a way to strengthen
its relationships with international organizations, both in Hargeisa and in Nairobi, in a
way that does not diminish ownership of the program by Somalilanders. In Hargeisa, the
program’s effectiveness would be enhanced by information exchange and logistical
coordination between WSP and organizations perceived as doing similar programming
(mainly LPI and UNESCO) if not by outright collaboration. For example it would ensure
that workshops are not held in the same place at the same time. More important are the
potential benefits to programming, which could result from collaboration on specific
activities. An example, described elsewhere in this paper, was the collaboration between
WSP and UINESCO in Puntland, where both organizations were addressing the issue of
qaat. WSP was able to disseminate the findings of its research over UNESCO’s radio
program. To its credit, WSP has invited international organization personnel to participate
in the Working Groups and consistently invites them to workshops.
In Nairobi, the program would succeed in its goal of impacting the policies and activities
of international organizations much more effectively were it to establish relationships
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with those organizations. In particular it is recommended that WSP establish a working
relationship with SACB. Again, the challenge is how to do this without sacrificing the
Somalilanddriven nature of the program. Even if the time is not ripe to include
international organizations in the workshops, efforts to encourage international
organizations to utilize the findings of the PAR would contribute to this goal. There are
different ways to accomplish this. One might be to hold regular workshops with
international organizations in Nairobi, along the lines of the Working Groups in Hargeisa.
These workshops might be attended by members of the research team and/or by members
of the Working Groups. Admittedly this is a labor and capital intensive proposal, and
more personnel and more funding would be required. In addition, an expanded staff may
have the negative effect of weakening the closeknit WSP team.
(2) Another recommendation is that WSP renew its commitment to the full integration of
women into the political and economic life of Somaliland as a key goal. If women are to
be genuinely integrated into the public life of Somaliland, organizational culture in the
decisionmaking realm will have to change. The culture of qaat, much like the culture of
after hours beer drinking in the West, is an important part of an organizational culture that
excludes women. WSP has taken the first steps by including women participants both in
the initial phase of the research and in their subsequent workshops. More importantly
WSP has included women’s concerns among the themes that workshops have addressed.
This has placed women’s concerns on the national agenda. WSP now needs to take these
concerns into consideration in terms of its internal organizational culture, in terms of the
culture that is promoted in the workshops, and by modeling new ways of doing things.
WSP Somaliland learned from the experiences of WSP Puntland and hired a woman
researcher. This may help account for the fact that WSP has succeeded in getting
women’s concerns on the agenda without generating a negative backlash. But having only
one woman in a maledominated environment can have the effect of isolating and
silencing that one woman. This is especially so in an organizational culture in which the
real business is conducted over qaat. It is therefore recommended that WSP strive for
greater gender balance on the research team.
(3) Should WSP expand its work beyond Somaliland and Puntland, to include other
regions in Somalia, it is highly recommended that the program begin in regions on the
periphery, rather than in Mogadishu. WSP might first conduct the program in those
regions that have achieved some measure of peace and afterwards in those regions that are
still contested. This recommendation is based on the contribution that the program has
and can make towards strengthening a political culture in which citizens have internalized
the idea that they have a right and a responsibility to communicate with their
representatives in local and national government, have the confidence born of experience
to do so, and have articulated regional issues and reached consensus about regional
priorities. Only then can some balance of power between the margins and the center be
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achieved. Some donors have indicated their eagerness to support the project in
Mogadishu, but they are advised to do so with caution.
Conclusion
Whatever the future relationship between Somaliland and Somalia, WSP will have made
a contribution towards peace in an conflicttorn region. Although WSP started in sites that
are relatively peaceful  Somaliland and Puntland  the program and process could make a
contribution to locations in Somalia that are in different stages of conflict as well.
In Somaliland, the program has contributed to taking the important first steps in the state
building and reconstruction processes. The WSP PAR process has created the space for
Somalilanders to: (1) articulate the issues and challenges confronting them (2) acquire a
better understanding of the paradoxes and tradeoffs involved in these processes (3)
explore alternatives that may lead to “winwin” solutions to problems (4) begin to build
consensus around priorities and approaches (5) facilitate local ownership of and
responsibility for these processes, (6) raise consciousness about the roles, the rights and
the responsibilities of citizens and government, and (7) demonstrate that there are
peaceful ways of resolving differences and conflicting needs and interests.
The WSP dialogue process can be identified as a best practice in that it has contributed
significantly to the empowerment, and in some cases the mobilization, of groups who
have much to contribute to building the types of polity, economy, and society, that will
achieve a sustainable peace, but who have more often than not been excluded from the
processes of statebuilding and reconstruction. These include women, members of civil
society, intellectuals, agricultural and livestock producers, and the populations of
peripheral towns and rural areas. The empowerment of these groups promises to have a
positive longterm impact on government policies and on the political culture of
Somaliland.
Although the clan remains the primary source of individual and group identity in
Somaliland, it does not necessarily in itself present the greatest challenge to state building
and peace building. Rather is the conflicting worldviews relating to the structures and
processes that will constitute the state that may prove to be the greatest constraint. Should
they be based on traditional Somali political and judicial systems? Should they replicate
Western democratic systems? Or should they be a synthesis of these two and/or other
systems?
If WSP Somaliland decides to engage with the international community, the program may
be identified as a best practice for ensuring the all Somalilanders, whether elites, middle
level, and grassroots, have a voice in determining the policies and activities of
international organizations. In contexts in which the state is either nascent, as in
Somaliland, or nonexistent, as it was until recently and remains in much of Somalia, the
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dialogue process can ensure that the priorities and aspirations of the population are made
known to international organizations.
In contexts in which the state is illegitimate and unrepresentative, as it is in other
countries in the region and elsewhere in the world, the dialogue process also has the
potential to contribute to conflict prevention. By providing a vehicle for the population to
communicate with the international community, the dialogue process has the potential to
contribute to ensuring that the policies and activities of international organizations, not
only do not contribute to aggravating latent conflicts, but are targeted in such a way that
they can contribute to preventing them from becoming violent conflicts.
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